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ﬁnd that apart from geography, political system, religion, and the level of economic devel-
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for differences in development. Our results show that social institutions that deprive women
of their autonomy and bargaining power in the household, or that increase the private costs
and reduce the private returns to investments into girls, are associated with lower female ed-
ucation, higher fertility rates and higher child mortality. Moreover,social institutions related
to gender inequality are negatively associated with governance measured as rule of law and
voice and accountability.
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Institutions are a major factor explaining development outcomes. They guide human be-
havior and shape human interaction (North, 1990). Institutions are humanly-devised to
reduce uncertainty and transaction cost, they are rooted in culture and history and some-
times they are taken-for granted and become beliefs (Hall and Taylor, 1996; De Soysa and
Jütting, 2007). Our study centers on a special type of institutions and their explanatory
value for development outcomes: social institutions related to gender inequality.
It is a settled fact that gender inequalities come at a cost. Besides the consequences that
the affected women experience as they are deprived of their basic freedoms (Sen, 1999),
gender inequalities affect the whole society. They can lead to ill-health, low human cap-
ital, bad governance and lower economic growth (e.g. World Bank, 2001; Klasen, 2002).
Gender inequalities can be observed in outcomes like education, health and economic and
political participation, but they are rooted in gender roles that evolvefrom institutionsthat
shape everyday life and form role models that people try to fulﬁl and satisfy. We refer
to these long-lasting norms, values and codes of conduct as social institutions related to
gender inequality.
We investigate the impact of these social institutions related to gender inequality on
development outcomes controlling for relevant determinants such as religion, political
system, geography and the level of economic development. As development outcomes
we choose indicators from the ﬁelds of education, demographics, health and governance.
In particular, we use female secondary schooling, fertility rates, child mortality and gov-
ernance in the form of rule of law and voice and accountability. We choose these in-
dicators as they are related to economic development and allow us to ﬁnd out whether
social institutions related to gender inequality hinder progress in reaching the Millennium
Development Goals.1
Most of the studies that have a similar research focus are conducted at the household
level and proxy social institutions related to gender with measures of autonomy or status
of women (e.g. Abadian, 1996; Hindin, 2000). At the cross-country level data are scarce
and therefore only few studies are available that center on the development impact of
gender-relevant social institutions (e.g. Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jütting et al., 2008).
In Branisa et al. (2009) and Branisa et al. (2009) we propose several new composite
indices that measure social institutions related to gender inequality at the country level:
the Social Institutionsand Gender Index (SIGI) and its ﬁve subindices Family Code, Civil
1 In particular, goal 3 “Promote gender equality and empower women”, goal 4 “Reduce child mortality”
and goal 5 “Improvematernal health” are relevant here, althoughthe other goals can be at least indirectly
linked to our chosen indicators.
2liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference and Ownership rights. These measures use
as input variables from the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development database.2 We
are not aware of other measures that provide a similar encompassing way to capture the
institutional basis of gender inequality at the cross-country level.
In this paper we use these newly proposed measures and check whether they are asso-
ciated with the chosen development outcomes at the cross-country level. We proceed as
follows. First, we look for relevant theories linking- at least implicitly- social institutions
related to gender inequality with development outcomes such as health, demographics,
education and the governance of a society. We refer to bargaining household models (e.g.
Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993) and
models considering the costs and returns of children (e.g. Becker, 1981; King and Hill,
1993; Hill and King, 1995) as well as to contributions from several disciplines on gov-
ernance and democracy. These contributions focus on differences in behavior between
men and women, and on the role of women’s movements countervailing power to per-
sonal rule and clientelism (e.g. Swamy et al., 2001; Tripp, 2001). Second, we run several
linear regressions with the outcome indicators as dependent variables and the SIGI and
its subindices as the main explanatory variables. Our results show that social institutions
related to gender inequality matter; higher inequality in social institutions is associated
with lower development outcomes. In a related paper, Jütting and Morrisson (2009) fol-
low the same econometric procedure we use here and study the impact of the SIGI and its
subindices on gender inequality on labor market outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the concept and mea-
surementofsocial institutionsrelated to genderinequality. In section3 we reviewexisting
theory on household decision-making and incorporate social institutions into the models,
deriving hypotheses on their impact on female education, fertility and child mortality. In
section 4 we formulate hypotheses on the impact of social institutions on rule of law, and
voice and accountability based on the literature on governance, democracy and gender.
Data is described in section 5. The empirical estimation and the results are presented in
section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The data are available at the web-pages http://www.wikigender.org and
http://www.oecd.org/dev/gender/gid.
32 Social institutions related to gender inequality:
Concept and measurement
There are several approaches to institutions. According to North (1990, p. 3 ff.) “insti-
tutions are the rules of the game in a society”, they are “humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction”. From an economics perspective, institutions are conceived as
the result of collective choices in a society to achieve gains from cooperation by reducing
uncertainty, collective action dilemmas and transaction costs. A sociological or cultural
perspective, that is complementary to the rational choice one, relates institutions to cul-
ture. Institutions in this sense frame meanings and beliefs. People try to satisfy norms
rather than to act individually within the rules of the game, i.e. institutions do not canal-
ize preferences of actors, they inﬂuence the preferences and shape the role models and
identities of the actors themselves. Actors and institutions amalgamate so that actors are
often not aware of the guiding principles of their behavior. Legitimacy and appropriate-
ness drive institutional evolution more than efﬁciency considerations. Cultural authority,
power in a society and community dynamics might be more relevant in shaping such
institutions that become taken-for-granted without continuously being evaluated against
efﬁciency considerations (Hall and Taylor, 1996, and references therein).
Social institutions related to gender inequality that build the focus of our study are
more embedded in the cultural-sociological account although efﬁciency issues may also
matter. We conceive these social institutions as long-lasting norms, values and codes
of conduct that ﬁnd expression in traditions, customs and cultural practices, informal
and formal laws. They are at the bottom of gender roles and the distribution of power
between men and women in the family, in the market and in social and political life. As
social institutions related to gender inequality build an often taken-for-granted basis of
people’s behaviorand interaction in all spheres of life, they shape the social and economic
opportunities of men and women, their autonomy in taking decisions (Dyson and Moore,
1983; Abadian, 1996; Hindin, 2000; Bloom et al., 2001) or the capabilities to live the life
they value (Sen, 1999). That is why they might affect important development outcomes
and contribute to outcome gender inequalities (De Soysa and Jütting, 2007).
As we are interested in the impact of social institutions related to gender inequality we
make use of the recently proposed Social Institutionsand Gender Index (SIGI) and its ﬁve
subindices Family code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference and Ownership
rights (Branisa et al., 2009) that cover between 102 and 123 developing countries.3 These
3 As discussed in Branisa et al. (2009), an alternative measure of social institutions would
be the Women’s Social Rights index (WOSOC) of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project
4cross-country composite measures are built out of twelve variables of the OECD Gender,
Institutions and Development Database that proxy social institutions through prevalence
rates, indicators of social practices and legal indicators.(Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jüt-
ting et al., 2008).4
The ﬁve subindices of the SIGI measure each one dimension of social institutions re-
lated to gender inequality. For that reason, the method of polychoric principal component
analysis (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009) is chosen to extract the common information of
the variables corresponding to a subindex. The Family code subindex captures institu-
tions that directly inﬂuence the decision-making power of women in the household. It
is composed of four variables that measure whether women have the right to be the le-
gal guardian of a child during marriage and whether women have custody rights over a
child after divorce, whether there are formal inheritance rights of wives, the percentage
of girls between 15 and 19 years of age who are/were ever married, and the acceptance
of polygamy in the population.5 The Civil liberties subindex covers the freedom of social
participation of women and combines two variables, freedom of movementof women and
freedom of dress, i.e. whether there is an obligation for women to use a veil or burqa to
cover parts of their body in the public. The Physical integrity dimension comprises two
indicators on violence against women, the existence of laws against domestic and sexual
violence and the percentage of women who have undergone female genital mutilation.
The subindex Son preference measures the economic valuation of women and is based on
a ‘missing women’ variable that measures an extreme form of preferring boys over girls
based on information of the female population that has died as a result of gender inequal-
ity. The last subindex Ownership rights covers the access of women to several types of
property: land, credits and property other than land. The values of the SIGI and of all
the subindices are between 0 and 1. The value 0 means no or very low inequality and the
value 1 indicates high inequality.
The SIGI combines the ﬁve subindices into a multidimensional measure of deprivation
of women in a country. It is inspired by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures
(Foster et al., 1984) and aggregates gender inequality in several dimensions measured
(http://ciri.binghamton.edu/) that measures from a human rights perspective the type of insti-
tutions we are interested in. We prefer to work with the SIGI and its subindices and not with WOSOC as
WOSOC also covers outcomes of these institutions and does not allow to differentiate between dimen-
sions of social institutions, e.g. between what happens within the family and what happens in public life.
Moreover, WOSOC can only take four values from 0 to 3 which makes it difﬁcult to compare countries
as there are many ties in the data.
4 The data are available at the web-pages http://www.wikigender.org and
http://www.oecd.org/dev/gender/gid.
5 Countries where this information is not available are assigned scores based on the legality of polygamy.
5by the subindices. The underlying methodology of construction leads to penalization
of high inequality in each dimension and allows only for partial compensation between


















(Subindex Ownership Rights)2 (1)
The main shortcoming of these indices is that they cover only developing countries. This
is due to the fact that the variables used as input do not measure relevant social institu-
tions related to gender inequalities in OECD countries. Further research is required to
develop appropriate measures for developed countries. Nevertheless, these social institu-
tions indicators are innovativemeasures of the social, economic and political valuation of
women and add information to other existing measures of gender inequality in well-being
and empowerment such as the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM) from United Nations Development Programme (1995),
the Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum (Lopez-Claros and Za-
hidi, 2005), the Gender Equity Index developed by Social Watch (Social Watch, 2005),
and the African Gender Status Index proposed by the Economic Commission for Africa
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). The SIGI and its subindices focus on the roots
of gender inequality in a society and not on gender inequality in outcomes. The ranking
of countries according to the SIGI and its subindices is presented in Table 1.
3 Social Institutions and Household Decisions
In this section we review the existing literature about the potentials effects of social insti-
tutions related to gender inequality on the outcomes female education, fertility and child
mortality. It is not in the scope of this study to develop a formal model that incorporates
social institutions as a main variable and speciﬁes the exact functional relationships. In-
stead, we use existing theories that givehints on how social institutionsoperate. We focus
on the microeconomic literature as we assume that the effect of social institutions related
to gender inequality operates at the micro-level affecting decisions of households. This
literature provides the necessary micro-foundation for our empirical analysis which as a
consequence of our aggregated country data can only be conducted at the macro-level.
We use the non-unitary approach to the household and the method of Net Present Value
6to illustrate the effect of social institutions related to gender inequality on the outcomes
female education, fertility and child mortality. Non-unitary household models show that
householddecisionsaretheresultofthedistributionofbargainingpowerinthehousehold.
The essence is that outcomes are affected by who takes the decision. Common to the non-
unitarymodels, that were initiatedby Manserand Brown (1980)and McElroy and Horney
(1981), is a game-theoretic approach to the household. Husband and wife have their own
utility function, Uh(ch) for the husband and Uw(cw) for the wife, that depend each on
the consumption of private goods c.6 They bargain over the allocation of resources to
maximize their utility. In the case they do not reach agreement they receive a payoff
which corresponds to an individual ‘threat point’, Ph(S,Z) and Pw(S,Z) which comprises
the utilities associated with non-agreement.7 S and Z are deﬁned below. The implication
of non-unitary models is that household members do not simply pool resources and that
inequality in power may cause inequality in outcomes (Kanbur, 2003; Pollak, 2003, 2007;
Lundberg and Pollak, 2008).8 Empirical evidence shows that bargaining takes place and
that who controls resources in the household signiﬁcantly affects allocation decisions
and that decisions by women differ from those taken by men (e.g. Thomas, 1990, 1997;
Schultz, 1990; Lundberg et al., 1997; Haddad and Hoddinott, 1994; Rasul, 2008).
If husband and wife have to take decisions about their sons and daughters which will
affect the future then the consideration of who takes the decision must be complemented
with that of time. The method of the Net Present Value (NPV) allows to take into account
not only present but also future costs and returns to investments in boys and girls (e.g.
King and Hill, 1993, chapter 1). The NPV affects the decision of the household members.
To simplify the illustration we ignore that bargaining takes place and name the decision-
maker ‘parents’. The maximization of utility in a multi-period model leads parents to
considerthecostsand returns oftheirinvestmentin theirchildren. Thisprivatecalculation
of parents at period t = 0 can then be represented with the NPV of the investment in a




(1+r)t where T is the number of time periods considered,
6 Certainly, there are public goods in the household that both husband and wife consume within the mar-
riage.
7 The threat point may be external to the marriage. In this case it corresponds to the individual’s utility
outside the family in case of divorce, as it is modeled in the divorce threat models of Manser and Brown
(1980)and McElroyand Horney (1981). In the separate spheres bargainingmodels of Lundbergand Pol-
lak (1993) the threat point is internal to the marriage and is the utility associated with a non-cooperative
equilibriumwithinmarriagegivenbytraditionalgenderrolesandsocialnorms,wherethespousesreceive
beneﬁts due to the joint consumption of public goods.
8 UsingNash-Bargainingasolutiontothesenon-unitarymodelscanbefound. Husbandandwifemaximize
the Nash product function N = [Uh(ch−Ph(S,Z)][Uw(cw−Pw(S,Z)], that is subject to a pooled budget
constraint. The result is the demand function ci = fi(p,y,S,Z) with p for prices, y for total household
income and i = w,h (Lundbergand Pollak, 2008).
7Rrepresentsthereturns, K thecostsofinvestmentsinachild, andr representsthediscount
rate. Like the threat point P in the non-unitary models, R and K are functions of S and
Z that will be explained below. If the NPV is positive parents decide to invest in a child.
Gender inequality in the investments in boys and girls arises if the NPV of boys is larger
then the one of girls.9
Finally, let us explain S and Z. S can be deﬁned as ‘extrahousehold environmental pa-
rameters’ (McElroy, 1990) or ‘gender-speciﬁc environmental parameters’ (Folbre, 1997)
that inﬂuence the threat point in the non-unitary household models and the NPV of a
child. We consider that S can be best described as social institutions related to gender
inequality. Z represents all other inﬂuential factors besides S that affect the threat point
in the non-unitary model and the NPV of a child.
3.1 Social Institutions and Female Education
There are several ways how social institutions related to gender inequality might affect
the costs and returns of educational investments.10 Social institutionsrelated to gender in-
equality inﬂuence the costs of education as they shape gender roles related to the division
of labor and the opportunity costs of educating girls. Opportunity costs include income
from child labor and are higher for girls when they are expected to do housework, to care
for their younger siblings or to work in agriculture. Boys are in general less engaged in
household production. Moreover, traditions like paying a dowry increase costs and nega-
tively affect parents’ decision to educate their daughters (Hill and King, 1995; Lahiri and
Self, 2007).
Social institutionsrelated to gender inequality also affect the returns to education. They
are generally lower for girls than for boys because girls and women are discriminated on
the labor market in the form of entry restrictions and wage gaps. Thus, boys are expected
to be economically more productive. They become or are by tradition the building block
of their parents’ old-age security. Moreover, parents cannot expect or expect only low
returns from female education when the daughter marries and leaves the house implying
that the family loses her labor force (Pasqua, 2005; Song et al., 2006). Another issue
that may be considered by the parents’ calculation is receiving a bride price that does not
9 See Pasqua (2005) who considers both perspectives, the non-unitary approach to the household and the
cost and returns approach in the case of education of girls.
10 It must be noted that the private NPV of investments in the education of children does not correspond
to the social NPV. Social returns to education, especially female education, are often higher than the
private ones. There is evidence that society beneﬁts from female education as it contributes to overall
development and drives economic growth (Hill and King, 1995; Klasen, 2002; Braunstein, 2007; Klasen
and Lamanna, 2009). The resulting investment in female education will then often be sub-optimal.
8compensate the investments in the education of a girl (Hill and King, 1995).
In addition to these considerations, social institutions related to gender inequality can
affect the supply of schooling which might reduce incentives to send girls to school.
School environments that are hostile to the needs of girls could inﬂuence parents’ deci-
sion to send girls to school. Examples are that no latrines are provided, no female teachers
are available, distances to school are too long or prices favor boys (Hill and King, 1995;
Alderman et al., 1996; Pasqua, 2005; Lahiri and Self, 2007).
The costs and returns perspective does not rule out that the distribution of decision-
making power in the household matters, too. The non-unitary household approach is also
useful to explain low female education (Pasqua, 2005). Several empirical studies show
that when women dispose of more resources, investments in the education of girls are
higher (e.g. Schultz, 2004; Emerson and Souza, 2007).
Hypothesis 1: Social institutions that deprive women of their autonomy and bargaining
power in the household or that increase the private costs and reduce the private returns
to investments into female education are associated with lower female education than in
a more egalitarian environment.
3.2 Social Institutions and Fertility and Child Mortality Rates
Social institutions related to gender inequality that restrict female decision-making power
in the household and reduce the NPV of the investment in girls in comparison to boys do
not only lead to low female education but also to higher fertility levels and higher child
mortality.
We ﬁrst focus on fertility. Using a non-unitaryhousehold approach it can beargued that
the net utility of a woman associated with getting a child might differ from that of a man.
Assuming that both derive the same satisfaction of having a child, the net utility a woman
derives is lower than the one of the man as the woman bears most of the costs of having
children. These costs are related to the discomfort of pregnancy, health risks related to
pregnancy, and the income losses associated with time spent on child care. This might
explain why women might want less children than men, but cannot achieve their objec-
tives in the presence of social institutions that restrict their power in limiting the number
of children born. Empirical studies support the hypothesis that reduced female bargaining
power leads to shorter time spans between births, a loweruse of contraceptives and higher
fertility levels (Thomas, 1990; Abadian, 1996; Hindin, 2000; Saleem and Bobak, 2005;
Seebens, 2008).
9The perspective of the NPV gives a second explanation for higher fertility if there are
social institutions that favor gender inequality. In the absence of well-functioning in-
surance markets and pension systems, parents in developing countries may need more
children to feel secure. Depending on the costs of a child and the returns to the invest-
ment in a child parents will consider to get more children.11 As it was explained in the
previous subsection on female education, social institutions related to gender inequality
affect the NPV of investments in children. If these social institutions lower income earn-
ing opportunities for girls, the NPV of investments in girls will be lower than the NPV of
investments in boys so that sons often yield the promise of more economic security than
daughters do. As long as parents cannot perfectly control the sex of their offspring, they
will bear more children to increase the chance of having more sons (Cain, 1984; Abadian,
1996; Kazianga and Klonner, 2009).
Child mortality is our next development outcome of interest. To explain higher child
mortality levels in the presence of social institutions that disadvantage women one has to
consider that mothers are usually the primary caregivers of children in developing coun-
tries. In line with the non-unitary approach, if mothers have only limited power in the
household and are not free to take decisions, they are constrained in the use of health care
or in the access to food and other goods necessary for children and cannot take care of
their children as they would without those restrictions. This might lead to worse child
health and higher child mortality rates (Thomas, 1990, 1997; Bloom et al., 2001; Smith
et al., 2002; Maitra, 2004; Shroff et al., 2009).
From the NPV perspective it might be rational for parents to invest more in the health
and nutrition of boys than in girls who as a consequence could suffer more heavily from
health problems and experience higher mortality rates than boys. It is possible that this
behavior increases overall child mortality rates. Moreover, the limited education and in-
formation that women typically experience in patriarchal societies as a result of past NPV
calculations of their parents or as a result of lacking opportunities for information in the
society might also lead to worse child health as measured e.g. by anthropometric indica-
tors and to higher child mortality ﬁgures (Schultz, 2002; Shroff et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 2: Social institutions that deprive women of their autonomy and bargaining
power in the household or that increase the privatecosts and reduce the private returns of
11 Womenmightbeevenmoredependentontheirchildrenthantheirhusbandsiftheylivein anenvironment
of social institutions hostile to women where they lack access to resources, ﬁnancial security and legal
protection.
10investments into girls are associated with higher fertility levels and higher child mortality
than in an egalitarian environment.
4 Social Institutions and the Society: Governance
Social institutions related to gender inequality do not only inﬂuence household behavior,
they also determine the place women have in society. In societies where social institutions
limit the rights of women, their access to resources and protection, and where women’s
place is restricted to the private sphere, they usually have only a limited say in the public
and political domain. They have only few possibilitiesto organize themselvesin women’s
associationsas well as to enter the political arena. What is the impact of social institutions
related to gender inequality on governance?
Various disciplines (economics, politics and sociology) consider the issue of gover-
nance at all levels and sectors of a society. Although there is a variety of deﬁnitions of
the concept, common to the different approaches are issues like responsiveness, steer-
ing and governability, accountability and legitimacy. We rely on the general deﬁnition
of Kaufmann et al. (2008, p. 7) who developed several well-known governance indica-
tors and deﬁned governance “broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority
in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected,
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and im-
plement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions among them.” The World Bank states that in
general gender inequalities come at the cost of governance (World Bank 2001). Evidence
and causal mechanisms are rather suggestive. There are at least two explanations of why
social institutions consolidating gender roles hinder high quality governance.
First, there exist psychological and sociological explanations that center on arguments
that women are less corrupt and less egoistic than men. They are more risk-averse and
tend to follow the rules. Moreover, women’s socialization is more community-oriented
and hence, women often represent not only their needs but also the needs of other social
groups (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). Therefore, societies that give women
economic and political power will have a political system that is more rule oriented,
responsive and accountable compared to a society where women’s participation is op-
pressed.12
12 Policy decisions are inﬂuenced by politicians’ gender, as it is shown by Chattopadhyayand Duﬂo (2004)
in a randomized policy experiment in India. According to this study the type of public goods provided
depends on the gender of political leaders. Therefore, a balanced representation of men and women in
11Second, women’s movements have played and play a major role in increasing the qual-
ity of political systems (Waylen, 1993; Tripp, 2001). Tripp (2001) states for African
countries (notably Eastern and Southern Africa) that women’s movements represent one
of the most important forces challenging neopatrimonial rule that ﬁnds expression in pa-
tronage, clientelism and personal rule. Political reforms at the beginning of the 1990s
in form of free and competitive elections, freedom of expression and association, and
multi-party systems were not sufﬁcient to end the praxis of neopatrimonialism. Never-
theless, these reforms strengthened social forces like the movement of women that started
to demand the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness and accountability. In the be-
ginning, governments and political parties afﬁliated women to the system as they wanted
them to be part of it and to weaken their opposition. But women realized that they nei-
ther got access to formal political positions nor access to the beneﬁts of clientelism. The
denied access to power and participation in the political arena and in the economy that
had existed for years drove women to develop a different relation to the state and to the
execution of power than men. Especially, being part of an autonomous movement women
could claim the rule of law, equality and transparency. Moreover, by cross-cutting cleav-
ages like ethnicity or religion women’s movements did not only gain members but also
hindered clientelistic practices that go along those lines. Although there are no quanti-
ﬁed and universal results about the real effects of the power of women’s movements in
increasing the quality of political systems, this argumentation might be suggestive about
why countries with high gender inequality in social institutions might display a bad qual-
ity of governance. It might be because such social institutions hinder women in the ﬁrst
stage, namely to organize themselves and to express their interests.
Hypothesis 3: Social institutions related to high gender inequality inhibit the building
blocks of good governance. In societies with social institutions favoring gender inequal-
ity political systems will be less responsive and less open to the citizens, so that voice and
accountability will be reduced.
Hypothesis 4: Social institutions related to high gender inequality inhibit the building
blocks of good governance. In societies with social institutionsfavoringgender inequality
there might be more personal rule in the political system as well as inequality in justice
and legal systems, so that the rule of law will be weakened.
politics could be more responsive to the needs of the male and female population. This does not rule
out that women tend to be more community-orientedthan men and that they represent the needs of other
social groups such as those reﬂecting ethnicity or religion more than men do.
125 Data
Our investigationuses macro-data at the country level. Table 2 gives an overview over the
variables used for our estimations, the deﬁnitions and the data sources. Descriptive statis-
tics of the variables used are presented in Table 3. As main regressors we use the SIGI
and its ﬁve subindices Family code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son Preference and
Ownership rights in our estimations to check their explanatory value for the development
outcomes female education, fertility, child mortality and governance.
First, we are interested in the impact of social institutions on female education, fertil-
ity and child mortality. As dependent variables we use total fertility rates from World
Bank (2009) and child mortality rates from World Bank (2008). To measure education
we choose female gross secondary school enrollment rates because this enables impor-
tant functionings and empowers women. Furthermore we assume that parents take into
account that basic education of both boys and girls is necessary for fulﬁlling tasks related
to the household. Data for secondary school enrollment are from World Bank (2009).
Second, we want to estimate the association between governance and our social institu-
tions measures. We use the Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008)
and choose two of them to capture equality before the law, justice, tolerance and security
as well as responsiveness, political openness and accountability in the political system.
The rule of law index measures the extent to which contracts are enforced and property
rights are ensured and the extent to which people trust in the state and respect the rules
of the society. The voice and accountability index proxies civil and political liberties like
freedom of expression, freedom of association, free media and the extent of active and
passive political participation of citizens.
In all regressions we control for the level of economic development, religion, region
and the political system in a country. The speciﬁc variables we use are:
• the log of per capita GDP in constant prices to control for the level of economic
development (US$, PPP, base year: 2005);
• a Muslim majority and a Christian majority dummy to control for the impact of
religion,theleft-outcategorybeingcountriesthathaveneitheramajorityofMuslim
nor a majority of Christian population;
• region dummies to capture geography and other unexplained heterogeneity that
might go together with region, the left-out category being Sub-Saharan Africa;
• two political institutions variables, the electoral democracy variable and the civil
libertiesindexfromFreedomHouse(2008)thattogethermeasureliberaldemocracy
13which is assumed to be related to responsivenessto the needs of the public, political
openness and tolerance in a country.13
We use different additional control variables in each regression following suggestions
in the literature. In the fertility and child mortality regressions, we additionally control
for
• female literacy rates to measure the ability of women to control their reproductive
behavior, to care for themselves and their children (e.g. Basu, 2002; Hatt and Wa-
ters, 2006; Lay and Robilliard, 2009);
• a dummy proxying for high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates to control for extreme
health problems especially in Sub-Saharan Africa due to AIDS (e.g. Foster and
Williamson, 2000).
The Governance regressions exclude as control variables the civil liberties index from
Freedom House as this index is used to build the voice and accountability index that we
choose as dependent variable. We keep the electoral democracy variable because it does
not pose a problem. We additionally include as control variables
• the share of literate adult population to control for the population’s ability to be
informed, to express their needs and to hold politicians’ accountable (Keefer and
Khemani, 2005);
• ethnic fractionalization as it might disturb governance through identity politics, pa-
tronage and distribution conﬂicts (e.g. Collier, 2001; Tripp, 2001);
• a measure of trade openness as openness increases the incentives to build ‘good’
institutions to attract trading partners, to join trading agreements etc. (e.g. Al-
Marhubi, 2005).
Social institutions, i.e. normative frameworks, change only slowly and incrementally.
As the social institutionsindicators are not expected to change much over time we have to
decide which year or timespan should be covered by the othervariables. For our response
variables we choose to take the average of the existing values over ﬁve or six years (2000-
2005, 2001-2005). For the control variables we take the averages of the existing values
over ten years (1996-2005).14 The averages provide information that is more stable than
using a particular year. Using a longer time span for the control variables than for the
response variables allows to capture possible time delays until effects can be observed.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the choice of the time spans is arbitrary.
13 We multiply the civil liberties index by -1 to facilitate interpretation.
14 The ethnic fractionalization variable is constant over time as changes in the ethnic composition of a
country at least over 20 and 30 years are rare.
146 Empirical estimation and Results
6.1 Empirical estimation
We compute the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between the ﬁve subindices to show that
theyare correlated, butnotperfectly. Weadditionallycomputethecorrelation betweenthe
social institutionsindices and the control variables to check whether the social institutions
indices are proxies for these control variables.
We then empirically test with linear regressions whether the composite measures re-
ﬂecting social institutions related to gender inequality si are associated with each of the
response variables yi, representing the chosen development outcomes. We estimate re-
gressions in the form
yi = g+bsi+control variablesi+ei (2)
usinginformationat the country level. We are mainly interested in testingthe null hypoth-
esis that the coefﬁcient b is zero at a statistical signiﬁcance level of a = 5%. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, it is reasonable to infer that the measure proxying social institu-
tions related to gender inequality does matter for the given response variable, as predicted
in the hypothesis from sections 3 and 4.
The general procedure used for each of the response variables consists of two steps.
First, we start examining the effect of SIGI. We begin our estimation with a simple linear
regression with SIGI as the only regressor si. We then run a multiple linear regression
adding the main group of control variables that consists of the level of economic devel-
opment, region dummies, religion dummies and the political system variables. If SIGI is
signiﬁcant in this regression, we continue and, if applicable, estimate the complete model
with all identiﬁed control variables to conﬁrm whether SIGI remains signiﬁcant.
As SIGI is a rather broad measure to rank and compare countries and policy implica-
tions are difﬁcult to derive from it, in a second step we focus on the subindices to get
a more precise idea about what kind of social institutions might be related to the cho-
sen development outcomes. We estimate the same multiple linear regression(s) described
aboveusing the ﬁve subindices as si one at a timeinstead of SIGI to explore which dimen-
sion of social institutions related to gender inequality seems to be the most relevant. In
the corresponding regression tables we only report the speciﬁcation with the subindex or
subindices that are statistically signiﬁcant. It must be noted that we keep and show even
those control variables that are not statistically signiﬁcant in the regression, as we want
to stress that the social institutions indices are associated with the development outcomes
15even if we include these control variables.
All regressions are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Regression diagnos-
tics not reported here suggest that heteroscedasticity is a possible issue in our data and
that there are inﬂuential observations that could drive our results. Concerning the ﬁrst
issue, it is known that if the model is well speciﬁed, the OLS estimator of the regression
parameters remains unbiased in the presence of heteroscedasticity, but the estimatorof the
covariance matrix of the parameter estimates can be biased and inconsistentmaking infer-
ence about the estimated regression parameters problematic. Violations of homoscedas-
ticity can lead to hypothesis tests that are not valid and conﬁdence intervals that are ei-
ther too narrow or too wide. To deal with heteroscedasticity, we use ‘heteroscedasticity-
consistent’ (HC) standard errors. This means that while the parameters are still estimated
with OLS, alternative methods of estimating the standard errors that do not assume ho-
moscedasticity are applied. As the samples we use contain less than 150 observations,
we use HC3 robust standard errors proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), which
are better in the case of small samples. These are the standard errors that are presented
in the regression Tables 6-10. Simulation studies by Long and Ervin (2000) have shown
that HC standard error estimates tend to maintain test size closer to the nominal alpha
level in the presence of heteroscedasticity than OLS standard error estimates that assume
homoscedasticity. These authors recommend the use of HC3 robust standard errors, es-
pecially for sample sizes less than 250, as they can keep the test size at the nominal level
regardless of the presence or absence of heteroscedasticity, with only a minor loss of
power associated when the errors are indeed homoscedastic.15
In addition to this, we also use bootstrap with 1000 replications to compute a Bias-
corrected and accelerated (Bca) 95% conﬁdence interval of the regression coefﬁcients
computed with OLS (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). One of the main advantages of boot-
strapping methods is that no assumptions about the sampling distribution or about the
statistic are needed. The results are not reported here, but are available upon request, and
conﬁrm that all the coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the 5% level in Tables 6-10 remain
signiﬁcant when using Bca 95% conﬁdence intervals around them.
To deal with the second issue and check whether inﬂuential observations drive the
results, we take the estimates of a regression obtained with OLS with standard variance
estimator to detect the observations with unusual inﬂuence or leverage based on Cook’s
distance. Cook’s distance is a commonly used estimate of the inﬂuence of a data point
15 Certainly, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are not a panacea for inferential problems under
heteroscedasticity. As pointedoutbysomeauthors,therearelimitationsandtrade-offsin theseestimators
(e.g. Kauermann and Carroll, 2001; Wilcox, 2001).
16when doing least squares regression. We exclude countries from the sample if the value
of Cook’s distance is larger than 4/n, with n being the number of observations, and re-
estimate each regression on the restricted sample with HC3 robust standard errors. In
all the cases we conﬁrm that even after we exclude inﬂuential observations, the results
remain basically unchanged.16 The regressions are not reported here, but are available
upon request.
We consider that the model speciﬁcation is reasonable. However, possible endogene-
ity of our main regressors si (the SIGI and its subindices) should be taken into account
when interpreting the coefﬁcients of si as they would be biased and inconsistent in this
case. Endogeneity is given if si is correlated with the disturbance ei in equation 2. There
are three sources of endogeneity: omitted variables, measurement error and simultaneity
(Wooldridge, 2002). We have included control variables to minimize omitted variable
bias, although it is impossible to completely rule out this problem. Concerning measure-
menterror, weregardtheSIGIandthesubindicesasadequateproxiesofsocialinstitutions
related to gender inequality. It is not very plausible that there are errors in measurement
that are related to the unobserved social institutions. The last source, simultaneity, arises
when si is determined simultaneously with yi. As was discussed in section 2, we consider
that social institutionsrelated to gender inequality si are relatively stable and long-lasting.
Therefore, we think it is unlikely that the response variables yi inﬂuence si. 17
6.2 Results
The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between the subindices is always positive, but not
always signiﬁcant (Table 4). The correlations between the subindices are always lower
than 0.6, with the exception of the correlation between the subindices Family Code and
Ownership rights, which is equal to 0.74. Table 5 shows that the absolute value of the
Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between the social institutions indicators and the control
variables is always lower than 0.6, except for the SIGI and thesubindices Familycode and
Ownership rights and the two variables capturing literacy of the whole population and of
the female population.
16 Asanalternativeprocedureweuserobustregressionwithiterativelyreweightedleastsquaresasdescribed
in Hamilton (1992), and conﬁrm that results are similar.
17 Social institutions are hard to measure. Therefore, sometimes one has to rely on legal indicators to
proxy them, although we acknowledge that this could pose problems as there is for example an inter-
national mechanism, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), that aims at changing social institutions through legal measures. However, the impact of
CEDAW on national legislation depends on the willingness of governments to sign and ratify it without
reservation and on its willingness and ability to enact the new laws. Given the constituting function of
social institutions for a society this could be difﬁcult and depends on many factors.
17Regression results using female secondary education as dependent variable are pre-
sented in Table 6. Regression (1) with SIGI as the only regressor yields a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant association. Higher levels of inequality are associated with lower
levels of female secondary education. The association vanishes in regression (2) if one
includes the level of economic development, religion, region and the political system as
control variables. Using the subindex Family code instead of SIGI as the main regressor
in regression (3) shows a different picture. The subindex is statistically signiﬁcant even
if the control variables are included. The adjusted coefﬁcient of determination R2 is 0.78.
Hence, we ﬁnd no evidence against Hypothesis 1 that states that social institutions related
to high gender inequality are negatively associated with female education.18
Results obtained using total fertility rate and child mortality as response variables are
shown in Tables 7 and 8. In both cases, the simple linear regression (1) using SIGI as the
only regressor shows a positive and signiﬁcant statistical association between SIGI and
the response variable. Higher levels of inequality are associated with higher levels of fer-
tility and with higher levels of child mortality. However, once control variables related to
the level of economic development, religion, region and the political system in a country
are included in regression (2), SIGI is not longer statistically signiﬁcant. This is not the
case when we use the subindex Family code as the main regressor, as it is signiﬁcant in
regression (3) which uses the same control variables, and even in regression (4) which
adds two additional regressors: the share of literate adult female population and a dummy
reﬂecting high adult HIV/AIDS prevalence. In regression (4) the obtained adjusted R2 is
0.84 for fertility and 0.82 for child mortality. Hence, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2, sug-
gesting that social institutions related to high gender inequality are associated with higher
fertility levels and higher child mortality.19 As the subindex Family code is the relevant
social institutions measure in our empirical estimations it seems that social institutions
that deprive women of their autonomy and bargaining power in the family and that might
restrict women’s possibilities outside the family do matter for female education, fertility
and child mortality.
Table 9 shows the results obtained for the dependent variable voice and accountability.
Regression (1) with SIGI as the only regressor shows a negative and statistically signif-
icant association: higher levels of gender inequality are associated with lower levels of
18 Regressions not reported here, but available upon request, using primary gross completion rates obtained
from World Bank (2008) instead of female secondary schooling as the dependent variable yield similar
results.
19 Regressions not shown here, but available upon request, conﬁrm that the results concerning mortality
rates hold when using infant mortality rates taken from World Bank (2008) instead of child mortality
rates as the dependent variable.
18voice and accountability. This association remains signiﬁcant in regression (2) where
we add the level of economic development, religion, region and the political system20
as control variables, and in the complete speciﬁcation shown in regression (3) where we
additionally include the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, the
literacy rate of the population, a measure of openness of the economy, and a measure of
ethnic fractionalization. In regression (3), we obtain an adjusted R2 of 0.69. We explore
which dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality is behind this result
and ﬁnd that it is the subindex Civil liberties. The speciﬁcations with the subindex Civil
liberties in regressions (4) and (5) show that this subindex is negatively associated with
voice and accountability and that this association is statistically signiﬁcant even with the
control variables. In regression (5) the adjusted R2 is 0.69. Hypothesis 3 cannot be re-
jected with this evidence suggesting that social institutions related to gender inequality
inhibit the building blocks of good governance in the form of voice and accountability.
The subindex Civil liberties is the relevant social institutions measure in our empirical
estimations. The freedom of women to participate in public life seems to increase the
quality of governance of a society. Relating back to theory, this could be due to the be-
havior of women as they tend to be more socially oriented than men and are a group that
cross-cuts cleavages in general.
Results for the other component of governance, rule of law, are shown in Table 10,
providing evidence for Hypothesis 4. Regression (1) shows a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant association between SIGI and rule of law: higher levels of inequality are asso-
ciated with lower levels of rule of law. This association remains signiﬁcant in regression
(2) where we add the level of economic development, religion, region and the political
system as control variables, and in the complete speciﬁcation in regression (3) where we
additionally include the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, the
literacy rate of the population, a measure of openness of the economy, and a measure of
ethnic fractionalization. In this last regression, we obtain an adjusted R2 of 0.51. Again,
we are interested in exploring which dimension of social institutions related to gender in-
equality is the relevant one for rule of law ﬁnding that two subindices matter: Ownership
rights and Civil liberties.21 The speciﬁcations with the subindices yield similar results to
thoseof the SIGI and are presented in regressions (4) and (5) for Ownership rights and (6)
and (7) for Civil liberties. For both subindices the adjusted R2 obtained for the complete
20 Recall that in the governance regressions we only include the electoral democracy variable of Freedom
House (2008) as the civil liberties index is included in the chosen governance indicators which are now
the response variables.
21 As shown in Table 4 the Pearson Correlation coefﬁcient between the subindices Ownership rights and
Civil liberties is 0.36.
19speciﬁcation is 0.56. As postulated in Hypothesis 4, social institutions related to gender
inequality seem to matter for governance inhibiting the rule of law, e.g. through personal
rule and inequality in justice. Assuming that women’s attitudes are different from those
of men and that they countervail clientelism and injustice, women’s power in a society
contributes to improve rule of law. The two subindices proxy where this power comes
from, with Ownership rights measuring economic power through access to property and
Civil liberties measuring the freedom to participate in and to shape public life.
A reasonable question is whether the social institutions indicators are capturing differ-
ent religions. In the regressions reported here, we control for religion using a Christian
and a Muslim dummy. As the results show, at least one subindex is signiﬁcant when we
control for religion. One could argue that what matters is how religion is practiced in the
considered regions, and that the SIGI and the subindices might capture regional practice
of religion. Therefore, we re-estimate all regressions including interactions between the
religion and region dummies. The results for the SIGI and the subindices remain un-
changed suggesting that they capture something different than religion and the regional
practice of it.22
7 Conclusion
This study presents several answers to the question why we should care about social in-
stitutions related to gender inequality beyond the intrinsic value of gender equality. We
derive hypotheses from existing theories and empirically test them with linear regres-
sion at the cross-country level using the newly created Social Institutions and Gender
Index (SIGI) and its subindices. Our results show that social institutions related to gender
inequality are associated with lower female secondary education, higher fertility rates,
higher child mortality and lower levels of governance measured as voice and account-
ability and rule of law. We ﬁnd that apart from geography, political system, the level
of economic development and religion, one has to consider social institutions related to
gender inequality to better account for differences in important development outcomes.
The empirical estimation follows a two-step procedure for each outcome measure.
First, the focus is to examine the explanatory value of the SIGI. In the speciﬁcations in-
cluding all control variables, the SIGI is signiﬁcant in the regressions for the governance
measures voice and accountability and rule of law. If one interprets the SIGI as a sum-
mary measure of lack of power of women in all spheres of the society then it seems that
22 The results are available upon request.
20when women have more power governance is better.23 In the case of female secondary
schooling, fertility rate and child mortality the SIGI turns out to be insigniﬁcant in the
complete speciﬁcations.
Second, as the SIGI is a broad measure of social institutions related to gender in-
equality, we investigate which particular dimension of social institutions is signiﬁcantly
related to the chosen development outcomes using the complete speciﬁcations. The
subindexFamily code is negatively associated with female education, fertility and child
mortality. These results suggest that social institutions that deprive women of their au-
tonomy and bargaining power in the family do matter for female education, fertility and
child mortality. The subindex Civil liberties is the dimension of social institutions that is
signiﬁcantly related to the governance component voice and accountability. The freedom
of women to participate in public life seems to increase the quality of governance of a
society as women tend to be more socially oriented than men and are a group that cross-
cuts cleavages in general. The rule of law component of governance is negatively related
to the subindices Civil liberties and Ownership rights. The two subindices proxy where
this power comes from, with Ownership rights measuring access to property and Civil
liberties measuring the freedom to participate in public life. Assuming that women’s atti-
tudes are different from those of men and that they countervail clientelism and injustice,
women’s power in a society is a relevant factor to improve rule of law.
Although the subindices Family code, Ownership rights and Civil liberties are the more
important dimensions of social institutions related to gender inequality for the response
variables considered in this study, this does not mean that the other two subindices Son
preference and Physical integrity are not important intrinsically.
Case studies investigating the mechanisms between social institutions and the outcome
variables are necessary. Our study has the limitations of any cross-sectional regression
analysis as we cannot rule out omitted variable bias. Causality can never be derived
from regression analysis with cross-sectional data unless at least valid instruments are
found. Concerning the results of the subindices, these should be considered exploratory
and need to be conﬁrmed with further research which should also include the elaboration
of appropriate theories linking social institutions related to gender inequality with each of
the development outcomes used in this study.
Social institutions are long-lasting and deep-seated in people’s minds. Changing them
is a difﬁcult task and requires approaches tailored to the particular needs and the socio-
economic context (Jütting and Morrisson, 2005). The state can certainly help attenuate
23 The association between two composite measures like the SIGI and the governance indicators has to be
interpreted carefully.
21the effects of social institutions through speciﬁc policies. It may set incentives to coun-
teract social institutions, e.g. in the form of laws to ﬁght against discriminatory practices
or through the implementation of programs favoring girls and women. Micro-credit pro-
grams or subsidies targeted at mothers are good examples here. Nevertheless, changing
social institutions needs more than that. It needs a thorough understanding of the power
relations in a country and people that are willing to become reform drivers and initiate
learning processes that should be complemented by deliberation and public discussion
at all levels of society. Be it through internal or external forces, women need help to
empower themselves. That is what Sen calls ‘agency of women’ (Sen, 1999).
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29Appendix
Rankings of Countries according to the SIGI and its Subindices
Table 1: Rankings of Countries according to the SIGI and its Subindices
SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Paraguay 1 0.00248 19 0.06890 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 1 0
Croatia 2 0.00333 3 0.00811 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Kazakhstan 3 0.00348 5 0.02837 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Argentina 4 0.00379 13 0.04864 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Costa Rica 5 0.00709 23 0.08106 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 1 0
Russian Federation 6 0.00725 35 0.14028 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Philippines 7 0.00788 8 0.04053 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 53 0.17351
El Salvador 8 0.00826 17 0.06485 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 43 0.17151
Ecuador 9 0.00914 24 0.08917 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 53 0.17351
Ukraine 10 0.00969 8 0.04053 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Mauritius 11 0.00976 11 0.04458 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Moldova 12 0.00980 12 0.04701 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Bolivia 13 0.00983 13 0.04864 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Uruguay 14 0.00992 15 0.05269 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Venezuela, RB 15 0.01043 21 0.07295 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Thailand 16 0.01068 41 0.15649 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 1 0
Peru 17 0.01213 15 0.05269 1 0 33 0.24059 1 0 1 0
Colombia 18 0.01273 21 0.07295 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 43 0.17151
Belarus 19 0.01339 4 0.02432 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Hong Kong, China 20 0.01465 26 0.10380 1 0 1 0 89 0.25 1 0
Singapore 21 0.01526 25 0.09975 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Cuba 22 0.01603 28 0.11754 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Macedonia, FYR 23 0.01787 39 0.15169 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Brazil 24 0.01880 19 0.06890 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 1 0
Tunisia 25 0.01906 32 0.12738 1 0 9 0.12878 89 0.25 1 0
Continued on next page
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SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Chile 26 0.01951 34 0.13909 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 56 0.17723
Cambodia 27 0.02202 38 0.14433 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 1 0
Nicaragua 28 0.02251 33 0.12970 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 43 0.17151
Trinidad and Tobago 29 0.02288 39 0.15169 1 0 15 0.16999 89 0.25 1 0
Kyrgyz Republic 30 0.02924 42 0.15980 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 56 0.17723
Viet Nam 31 0.03006 6 0.03242 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Armenia 32 0.03012 7 0.03648 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Georgia 33 0.03069 17 0.06485 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Guatemala 34 0.03193 27 0.10538 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 43 0.17151
Tajikistan 35 0.03262 47 0.25955 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 43 0.17151
Honduras 36 0.03316 44 0.21610 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 1 0
Azerbaijan 37 0.03395 37 0.14314 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Lao PDR 38 0.03577 51 0.32034 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 43 0.17151
Mongolia 39 0.03912 30 0.12001 1 0 48 0.29877 89 0.25 43 0.17151
Dominican Republic 40 0.03984 28 0.11754 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 58 0.34502
Myanmar 41 0.04629 35 0.14028 1 0 60 0.38634 89 0.25 1 0
Jamaica 42 0.04843 1 0.00405 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 76 0.35074
Morocco 43 0.05344 48 0.26279 1 0 9 0.12878 89 0.25 58 0.34502
Fiji 44 0.05450 8 0.04053 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 66 0.34874
Sri Lanka 45 0.05914 46 0.23404 98 0.30069 15 0.16999 1 0 66 0.34874
Madagascar 46 0.06958 70 0.41138 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 43 0.17151
Namibia 47 0.07502 58 0.35307 1 0 34 0.25756 89 0.25 66 0.34874
Botswana 48 0.08102 53 0.32163 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 79 0.52225
South Africa 49 0.08677 73 0.42326 84 0.29808 23 0.21635 1 0 58 0.34502
Burundi 50 0.10691 57 0.33545 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Albania 51 0.10720 31 0.12288 1 0 60 0.38634 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Senegal 52 0.11041 99 0.60250 1 0 45 0.26455 1 0 58 0.34502
Tanzania 53 0.11244 81 0.49886 1 0 22 0.20151 1 0 79 0.52225
Ghana 54 0.11269 61 0.36621 1 0 80 0.39575 1 0 79 0.52225
Indonesia 55 0.12776 59 0.35405 103 0.59876 79 0.39362 1 0 1 0
Eritrea 56 0.13645 76 0.45538 1 0 106 0.68910 1 0 1 0
Kenya 57 0.13704 63 0.37027 1 0 46 0.28152 1 0 111 0.68473
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SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Cote d’Ivoire 58 0.13712 79 0.49012 1 0 85 0.43455 1 0 77 0.50650
Syrian Arab Republic 59 0.13811 68 0.40269 98 0.30069 34 0.25756 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Malawi 60 0.14323 60 0.36087 84 0.29808 88 0.47362 1 0 79 0.52225
Mauritania 61 0.14970 71 0.42056 98 0.30069 103 0.60183 1 0 58 0.34502
Swaziland 62 0.15655 86 0.52144 84 0.29808 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Burkina Faso 63 0.16161 88 0.53939 1 0 104 0.63092 1 0 58 0.34502
Bhutan 64 0.16251 43 0.20513 84 0.29808 54 0.34513 118 0.75 1 0
Nepal 65 0.16723 62 0.36779 84 0.29808 48 0.29877 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Rwanda 66 0.16859 56 0.32974 1 0 91 0.51512 1 0 111 0.68473
Niger 67 0.17559 104 0.64882 1 0 99 0.52482 89 0.25 58 0.34502
Equatorial Guinea 68 0.17597 82 0.50291 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 79 0.52225
Gambia, The 69 0.17830 103 0.64303 1 0 102 0.59698 1 0 66 0.34874
Central African Republic 70 0.18440 92 0.55902 1 0 101 0.58029 1 0 79 0.52225
Kuwait 71 0.18602 83 0.50523 103 0.59876 34 0.25756 101 0.5 1 0
Zimbabwe 72 0.18700 80 0.49075 84 0.29808 59 0.36937 1 0 111 0.68473
Uganda 73 0.18718 102 0.63697 84 0.29808 81 0.41058 1 0 79 0.52225
Benin 74 0.18899 84 0.50633 1 0 87 0.46877 1 0 111 0.68473
Algeria 75 0.19024 69 0.40501 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 101 0.5 43 0.17151
Bahrain 76 0.19655 52 0.32147 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Mozambique 77 0.19954 109 0.69776 84 0.29808 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Togo 78 0.20252 96 0.58833 1 0 86 0.44452 1 0 111 0.68473
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79 0.20448 66 0.39038 1 0 81 0.41058 1 0 119 0.83752
Papua New Guinea 80 0.20936 50 0.27697 1 0 60 0.38634 118 0.75 78 0.50825
Cameroon 81 0.21651 89 0.54344 84 0.29808 90 0.48332 1 0 109 0.68175
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 0.21766 49 0.26647 98 0.30069 111 0.82273 101 0.5 1 0
China 83 0.21786 1 0.00405 1 0 48 0.29877 122 1 1 0
Gabon 84 0.21892 107 0.68387 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 79 0.52225
Zambia 85 0.21939 108 0.69197 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 111 0.68473
Nigeria 86 0.21991 71 0.42056 103 0.59876 89 0.47847 89 0.25 79 0.52225
Liberia 87 0.22651 87 0.53470 1 0 107 0.75756 1 0 79 0.52225
Guinea 88 0.22803 105 0.67140 1 0 105 0.64546 1 0 79 0.52225
Ethiopia 89 0.23325 55 0.32726 1 0 109 0.77424 1 0 108 0.67801
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SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Bangladesh 90 0.24465 95 0.58334 103 0.59876 2 0.04121 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Libya 91 0.26019 67 0.39285 103 0.59876 91 0.51512 101 0.5 79 0.52225
United Arab Emirates 92 0.26575 93 0.56197 103 0.59876 100 0.53180 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Iraq 93 0.27524 77 0.47391 103 0.59876 98 0.51997 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Pakistan 94 0.28324 64 0.37821 103 0.59876 47 0.28180 118 0.75 79 0.52225
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95 0.30436 91 0.55792 119 0.78099 91 0.51512 89 0.25 79 0.52225
India 96 0.31811 100 0.60655 103 0.59876 15 0.16999 118 0.75 79 0.52225
Chad 97 0.32258 111 0.79330 98 0.30069 84 0.43212 1 0 120 0.84049
Yemen 98 0.32705 97 0.59439 119 0.78099 60 0.38634 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Mali 99 0.33949 112 0.79735 1 0 114 0.97091 1 0 58 0.34502
Sierra Leone 100 0.34245 98 0.60159 1 0 110 0.79849 1 0 121 0.84424
Afghanistan 101 0.58230 110 0.71598 121 0.81777 91 0.51512 122 1 109 0.68175
Sudan 102 0.67781 106 0.67981 122 1 111 0.82273 101 0.5 122 1
Angola NA 89 0.54344 1 0 NA 89 0.25 79 0.52225
Bosnia and Herzegovina NA NA 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Chinese Taipei NA NA 1 0 3 0.08757 101 0.5 1 0
Congo, Rep. NA 101 0.62450 1 0 NA 1 0 79 0.52225
Guinea-Bissau NA NA NA 107 0.75756 1 0 111 0.68473
Haiti NA 65 0.37837 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 NA
Israel NA 45 0.22712 1 0 NA 1 0 1 0
Jordan NA 85 0.51739 103 0.59876 NA 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Korea, Dem. Rep. NA NA 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 1 0
Lebanon NA NA 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 1 0 53 0.17351
Lesotho NA 94 0.57149 84 0.29808 NA 1 0 79 0.52225
Malaysia NA 53 0.32163 103 0.59876 NA 1 0 1 0
Occupied Palestinian Territory NA 78 0.48607 103 0.59876 NA 1 0 66 0.34874
Oman NA 74 0.45364 84 0.29808 NA 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Panama NA NA 1 0 8 0.11181 1 0 1 0
Puerto Rico NA NA 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 NA
Saudi Arabia NA 74 0.45364 122 1 NA 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Serbia and Montenegro NA NA 1 0 NA NA 43 0.17151
Somalia NA NA 103 0.59876 113 0.84213 1 0 111 0.68473
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SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Timor-Leste NA NA 1 0 83 0.42755 89 0.25 79 0.52225
Turkmenistan NA NA 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Uzbekistan NA NA 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
3
47.1 Codebook
Table 2: Description and Sources of Variables
Variables Deﬁnition Source
Response Variables
Fertility Total fertility rate (births per woman) World Bank (2009)
(average of existing values over the last ﬁve years)
Child mortality Children under ﬁve mortality rate per 1,000 live births (year 2005) World Bank (2008)
Female secondary school School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross) World Bank (2009)
(average of existing values over the last ﬁve years)
Voice and accountability Index that combines several data sources based Kaufmann et al. (2008)
on expert perceptions of "the extent to which a country’s citizens are
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media"
(Kaufmann et al., 2008);
(average of existing values over the last ﬁve years)
Rule of law Index that combines several data sources based on expert Kaufmann et al. (2008)
perceptions of "the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as
the likelihood of crime and violence"
(Kaufmann et al., 2008);
(average of existing values over the last ﬁve years)
Regressors
SIGI Social Institutions and Gender Index Branisa et al. (2009)
Subindex family code Subindex Family code Branisa et al. (2009)
Subindex civil liberties Subindex Civil liberties Branisa et al. (2009)
Subindex physical integrity Subindex Physical integrity Branisa et al. (2009)
Subindex son preference Subindex Son preference Branisa et al. (2009)
Subindex ownership rights Subindex Ownership rights Branisa et al. (2009)
Literacy female Share of literate adult female population (15+) (%) year 2000 World Bank (2009)
Continued on next page
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(average of the existing values over the last 10 years)
Literacy population Share of literate population (whole) Human Development Report (HDR) stats ofﬁce
(average of the existing values over the last 10 years)
log GDP Log of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) World Bank (2008)
(average over the last 10 years)
FH civil liberties -1 * Index that measures the extent to which countries ensure Freedom House (2008)
civil liberties including freedom of expression, assembly, association,
education, and religion as well as personal autonomy. It covers
whether there is an established and generally equitable system
of rule of law, free economic activity and equality of opportunity.
(scale -1 (best) to -7 (worst))
(average of the existing values over the last 10 years)
Electoral democracy Index that qualiﬁes countries as electoral democracy when there Freedom House (2008)
exist competitive, universal and free and secret elections and a
multiparty system that can access the media for political
campaigning; (average of the existing values over the last 10 years)
Parliament Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) World Bank (2009)
(average of the existing values over the last 10 years)
Aids Adult (15-49) HIV prevalence percent by country, 1990-2007; UNAIDS/WHO (2008)
Countries were coded 1 if Adult (15-49) HIV prevalence rate
exceeds 5 per cent, otherwise 0.
Ethnic The ethnic fractionalization measure gives the probability that two Alesina et al. (2003)
individuals selected at random from a population are members of
different groups. It is calculated with data on language and origin




where sij is the proportion of group i = 1,...,
N in country j going from complete homogeneity (an index of 0)
to complete heterogeneity (an index of 1).
Openness Share of imports of goods and services of total GDP World Bank (2008)
Muslim Countries get a 1 if at least 50 % of the population are muslim, Central Intelligence Agency (2009)
0 otherwise.
Christian Countries get a 1 if at least 50 % of the population are christian, Central Intelligence Agency (2009)
0 otherwise.
Continued on next page
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SA Countries get a 1 if located in region South Asia,
0 otherwise.
ECA Countries get a 1 if located in region Europe and Central Asia,
0 otherwise.
LAC Countries get a 1 if located in region Latin America and the Caribbean,
0 otherwise.
MENA Countries get a 1 if located in region Middle East and North Africa
0 otherwise.




Table 3: Variables used
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SIGI 102 0.126 0.122 0.002 0.678
Subindex Family Code 112 0.326 0.223 0.004 0.797
Subindex Civil Liberties 123 0.160 0.259 0 1
Subindex Physical integrity 114 0.358 0.191 0 0.971
Subindex Son preference 123 0.134 0.240 0 1
Subindex Ownership rights 122 0.298 0.266 0 1
Fertility 121 3.562 1.702 0.933 7.678
Child mortality 119 80.005 67.777 3.758 273.8
Female secondary school 108 59.210 30.484 6.037 113.275
Rule of law 123 -0.563 0.718 -2.142 1.658
Voice and accountability 123 -0.583 0.752 -2.102 1.088
SA 124 0.056 0.232 0 1
ECA 124 0.137 0.345 0 1
LAC 124 0.177 0.384 0 1
MENA 124 0.145 0.354 0 1
EAP 124 0.137 0.345 0 1
Muslim 124 0.331 0.472 0 1
Christian 124 0.435 0.498 0 1
log GDP 115 7.988 1.121 5.609 10.553
Literacy population 121 0.741 0.218 0.173 1
Literacy female 106 0.705 0.251 0.128 0.998
Electoral democracy 120 0.455 0.459 0 1
FH civil liberties 121 -4.366 1.434 -7 -1.4
Parliament 118 10.630 6.925 0 29.556
Aids 116 0.138 0.346 0 1
Openness 119 0.452 0.261 0.013 1.914
Ethnic 120 0.517 0.237 0.039 0.930
38Table 4: Pearson Correlation Coefﬁcient between the SIGI and the Subindices
SIGI Subindex Subindex Subindex Subindex Subindex
Family Civil Physical Son Ownership
SIGI r 1
Obs. 102
Subindex Family r 0.793 1
p-value 0.0000
Obs. 102 112
Subindex Civil r 0.710 0.472 1
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Obs. 102 112 123
Subindex Physical r 0.661 0.594 0.282 1
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025
Obs. 102 103 113 114
Subindex Son r 0.535 0.179 0.530 0.020 1
p-value 0.0000 0.0594 0.0000 0.8312
Obs. 102 112 122 114 123
Subindex Ownership r 0.743 0.753 0.358 0.508 0.132 1
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.1504
Obs. 102 111 121 112 121 122
39Table 5: Correlation of the SIGI and the Subindices with the Control Variables
SIGI Subindex Subindex Subindex Subindex Subindex
Family Civil Physical Son Ownership
log GDP r -0.343 -0.390 0.196 -0.465 0.157 -0.481
p-value 0.0005 0.0000 0.0362 0.0000 0.0948 0.0000
Obs. 98 108 114 105 114 114
Muslim r 0.504 0.421 0.570 0.401 0.361 0.226
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0122
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
Christian r -0.386 -0.332 -0.396 -0.271 -0.368 -0.052
p-value 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 0.5662
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
SA r 0.298 0.134 0.326 -0.131 0.486 0.137
p-value 0.0023 0.1589 0.0002 0.1652 0.0000 0.1319
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
ECA r -0.316 -0.379 -0.248 -0.167 -0.166 -0.329
p-value 0.0012 0.0000 0.0057 0.0762 0.0659 0.0002
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
LAC r -0.424 -0.467 -0.289 -0.360 -0.240 -0.354
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0001 0.0076 0.0001
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
MENA r 0.231 0.164 0.533 0.083 0.417 0.017
p-value 0.0196 0.0843 0.0000 0.3796 0.0000 0.8501
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
EAP r -0.194 -0.294 -0.111 -0.149 0.096 -0.284
p-value 0.0505 0.0017 0.2205 0.1127 0.2934 0.0016
Obs. 102 112 123 114 123 122
Continued on next page
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Family Civil Physical Son Ownership
Electoral democracy r -0.388 -0.380 -0.344 -0.369 -0.217 -0.238
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0179 0.0091
Obs. 101 110 119 111 119 119
FH civil liberties r -0.443 -0.298 -0.421 -0.415 -0.279 -0.251
p-value 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0056
Obs. 101 110 120 112 120 120
Parliament r -0.145 -0.150 -0.279 -0.182 -0.165 -0.105
p-value 0.1514 0.1202 0.0023 0.0578 0.0750 0.2611
Obs. 100 109 117 110 118 117
Literacy population r -0.657 -0.696 -0.189 -0.585 -0.252 -0.586
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0389 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000
Obs. 102 112 120 112 121 119
Literacy female r -0.636 -0.679 -0.129 -0.581 -0.149 -0.617
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.1891 0.0000 0.1286 0.0000
Obs. 95 103 106 98 106 105
Openness r -0.195 -0.099 -0.071 -0.130 -0.125 -0.174
p-value 0.0509 0.2995 0.4465 0.1784 0.1775 0.0605
Obs. 101 111 118 109 118 117
Ethnic r 0.399 0.511 0.079 0.408 -0.105 0.463
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.3918 0.0000 0.2548 0.0000
Obs. 101 110 119 111 119 119
AIDS r 0.121 0.356 0.019 0.016 -0.194 0.361
p-value 0.2312 0.0002 0.8425 0.8684 0.0381 0.0001
Obs. 99 108 115 107 115 115
417.3 Regression Analysis
Table 6: Linear regressions with dependent variable female secondary school
Speciﬁcation with SIGI (1) (2) Speciﬁcation with Subindex (3)
b/se b/se b/se
SIGI -141.77*** -10.91 Subindex family code -39.10**
(37.31) (36.37) (11.64)
log GDP 12.69*** log GDP 11.46***
(3.39) (2.61)
Muslim -2.21 Muslim 3.43
(5.47) (4.84)
Christian 5.31 Christian 4.18
(5.48) (4.33)
SA 16.05 SA 12.3
(8.75) (8.44)
ECA 40.26*** ECA 28.25***
(8.98) (6.95)
LAC 18.33* LAC 8.64
(9.07) (7.41)
MENA 33.86** MENA 29.67**
(12.50) (9.69)
EAP 24.73** EAP 14.36*
(8.26) (6.53)
Electoral democracy 8.11 Electoral democracy 6.19
(7.67) (6.84)
FH civil liberties 1.95 FH civil liberties 2.72
(3.56) (2.89)
constant 74.75*** -56.71 constant -27.87
(4.12) (37.27) (30.56)
Number of obs. 94 91 Number of obs. 99
Adj. R-Square 0.28 0.75 Adj. R-Square 0.78
Prob>F 0.0003 0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
HC3 robust standard error in brackets.
Regression (2) and (3) with controls for economic development, geography, religion and
political system. In this case, this speciﬁcation corresponds to the complete speciﬁcation.
42Table 7: Linear regressions with dependent variable fertility
Speciﬁcation with SIGI (1) (2) Speciﬁcation with Subindex (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
SIGI 8.25*** 1.73 Subindex family code 1.89** 2.03**
(2.31) (2.61) (0.70) (0.70)
log GDP -0.71*** log GDP -0.60*** -0.43***
(0.16) (0.12) (0.12)
Muslim 0.52 Muslim 0.34 0.18
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Christian 0.25 Christian 0.24 0.46
(0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
SA -1.89*** SA -1.73*** -1.88***
(0.37) (0.41) (0.38)
ECA -2.44*** ECA -2.08*** -1.59***
(0.48) (0.38) (0.43)
LAC -0.96* LAC -0.68 -0.57
(0.47) (0.36) (0.40)
MENA -1.42* MENA -1.07* -1.23*
(0.63) (0.50) (0.48)
EAP -1.74*** EAP -1.37*** -1.20**
(0.42) (0.39) (0.38)
Electoral democracy -0.2 Electoral democracy 0.02 -0.03
(0.31) (0.29) (0.30)






constant 2.55*** 9.76*** constant 7.89*** 7.47***
(0.25) (1.82) (1.30) (1.29)
Number of obs. 100 97 Number of obs. 106 99
Adj. R-Square 0.31 0.82 Adj. R-Square 0.80 0.84
Prob>F 0.0006 0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
HC3 robust standard error in brackets.
Regression (2) and (3) with minimum of controls for economic development, geography, religion and
political system. Regression (4) with complete speciﬁcation for fertility.
43Table 8: Linear regressions with dependent variable child mortality
Speciﬁcation with SIGI (1) (2) Speciﬁcation with Subindex (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
SIGI 318.56** 50.42 Subindex family code 80.14** 77.23*
(108.81) (150.58) (25.85) (31.50)
log GDP -22.55** log GDP -20.24*** -13.82**
(7.35) (5.34) (5.09)
Muslim 26.61 Muslim 14.23 5.74
(14.13) (13.13) (14.50)
Christian 7.49 Christian 9.47 14.27
(11.72) (10.31) (10.81)
SA -68.33*** SA -61.30*** -71.03***
(18.87) (17.05) (16.33)
ECA -85.65*** ECA -66.13*** -53.16*
(23.82) (16.75) (20.65)
LAC -66.65** LAC -50.69*** -50.23**
(23.84) (14.88) (18.89)
MENA -97.73*** MENA -86.25*** -93.71***
(26.90) (21.71) (23.48)
EAP -73.44*** EAP -59.37*** -55.65**
(17.23) (15.02) (17.85)
Electoral democracy -0.79 Electoral democracy 7.05 1.75
(15.86) (15.96) (14.80)






constant 43.38*** 272.39** constant 209.47** 209.34**
(10.80) (93.09) (66.26) (63.27)
Number of obs. 99 97 Number of obs. 106 99
Adj. R-Square 0.28 0.79 Adj. R-Square 0.79 0.82
Prob>F 0.0043 0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
HC3 robust standard error in brackets.
Regression (2) and (3) with controls for economic development, geography, religion and
political system. Regression (4) with complete speciﬁcation for child mortality.
44Table 9: Linear regressions with dependent variable voice and accountability
Speciﬁcation with SIGI (1) (2) (3) Speciﬁcation with Subindex (4) (5)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
SIGI -2.60*** -1.42** -1.59** Subindex civil liberties -0.61** -0.65**
(0.50) (0.48) (0.54) (0.23) (0.23)
log GDP 0.27*** 0.30*** log GDP 0.31*** 0.27***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Muslim 0.18 0.15 Muslim 0.16 0.21
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Christian -0.03 -0.04 Christian -0.05 -0.08
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
SA -0.27 -0.28 SA -0.12 -0.04
(0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20)
ECA -0.64*** -0.56* ECA -0.52*** -0.57**
(0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.22)
LAC -0.40* -0.41* LAC -0.32* -0.31
(0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16)
MENA -0.45 -0.47 MENA -0.27 -0.23
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.24)
EAP -0.30* -0.21 EAP -0.14 -0.21
(0.14) (0.21) (0.13) (0.18)
Electoral democracy 1.10** 1.07*** Electoral democracy 1.13** 1.14***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Parliament 0.01 Parliament 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Literacy population -0.31 Literacy population 0.24
(0.42) (0.37)
Openness -0.07 Openness 0.23
(0.36) (0.22)
Ethnic -0.07 Ethnic 0.01
(0.25) (0.23)
constant -0.23* -2.80*** -2.77*** constant -3.28*** -3.37***
(0.10) (0.45) (0.47) (0.41) (0.39)
Number of obs. 102 97 95 Number of obs. 112 108
Adj. R-Square 0.18 0.69 0.69 Adj. R-Square 0.68 0.69
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
HC3 robust standard error in brackets.
Regression (2) and (4) with controls for economic development, geography, religion and political system.
Regressions (3) and (5) with complete speciﬁcation for governance/voice and accountability.
4
5Table 10: Linear regressions with dependent variable rule of law
Speciﬁcation with SIGI Speciﬁcation with Subindices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
SIGI -1.73*** -1.88*** -1.33* Subindex ownership -0.89*** -0.71** Subindex civil -0.75** -0.63*
(0.49) (0.53) (0.60) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25)
log GDP 0.41*** 0.36*** log GDP 0.37*** 0.30*** log GDP 0.47*** 0.36***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Muslim 0 -0.04 Muslim -0.03 -0.02 Muslim 0.04 0.11
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Christian -0.18 -0.18 Christian -0.11 -0.14 Christian -0.22 -0.22
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
SA 0.18 0.26 SA 0.11 0.21 SA 0.37 0.44
(0.22) (0.24) (0.17) (0.20) (0.22) (0.26)
ECA -0.84*** -0.67* ECA -0.93*** -0.83*** ECA -0.71*** -0.74**
(0.18) (0.27) (0.16) (0.22) (0.15) (0.22)
LAC -0.74*** -0.54* LAC -0.78*** -0.61** LAC -0.58*** -0.51**
(0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
MENA -0.14 0.17 MENA -0.09 0.18 MENA 0.10 0.30
(0.27) (0.32) (0.25) (0.29) (0.24) (0.28)
EAP -0.31 -0.28 EAP -0.35* -0.36 EAP -0.12 -0.23
(0.16) (0.23) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20)
Electoral democracy 0.33* 0.40** Electoral democracy 0.38** 0.44*** Electoral democracy 0.38** 0.46***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
Parliament 0.01 Parliament 0.01 Parliament 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Literacy population -0.29 Literacy population -0.03 Literacy population 0.20
(0.42) (0.38) (0.36)
Openess 0.69* Openess 0.71** Openess 0.73**
(0.33) (0.27) (0.23)
Ethnic -0.07 Ethnic -0.12 Ethnic -0.13
(0.32) (0.28) (0.27)
constant -0.35*** -3.37*** -3.32*** constant -3.06*** -2.94*** constant -4.05*** -3.83***
(0.10) (0.58) (0.52) (0.56) (0.53) (0.52) (0.46)
Number of obs. 102 97 95 Number of obs. 112 108 Number of obs. 112 108
Adj. R-Square 0.09 0.49 0.51 Adj. R-Square 0.53 0.56 Adj. R-Square 0.52 0.56
Prob>F 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
HC3 robust standard error in brackets.
Regression (2), (4) and (6) with controls for economic development, geography, religion and political system.
Regressions (3), (5) and (7) with complete speciﬁcation for governance/rule of law.
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6